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Contractual Assurances in Multinational





Much needs to happen, both on a political and on a jurisprudential
level, before a true globalization of the securities market can occur. The
cutting edge of legal and political change today, in both Japan and the
United States, is not being sharpened by academics, but by business-
people who are conducting real life transactions on a day-to-day basis.
The legal and regulatory changes of tomorrow are being driven and
shaped by today's business and economic needs.
Most merger and acquisition activity that has occurred to date be-
tween Japanese and American businesses has consisted of Japanese busi-
nesses acquiring American businesses. Americans hope that, in the
immediate years to come, major American companies will successfully
complete important acquisitions in Japan, so that investment capital will
flow freely in both directions across the Pacific. When this process oc-
curs, the political stage will be set for the legal changes required in order
to support true globalization of securities markets and development of
facilitating transactional laws. This paper attempts to focus specifically
on merger and acquisition activities between citizens of Japan and the
United States, and to spotlight several areas which merit particular
attention.
My interest in this subject matter was sparked and grew out of my
experiences with American-Japanese cultural differences which accumu-
lated from a transaction handled by my law firm two years ago. Our
client was a U.S. company, whose stock was being sold to a much larger
Japanese company. After months of protracted negotiations, the parties
finally executed a contract written in English, eighty-five pages long, and
containing fifty-seven exhibits. Of the eighty-five pages of the agreement,
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at least sixty-five contained covenants, conditions, representations, war-
ranties, and other commercial contractual assurances. At the celebration
dinner which followed the signing, the president of the acquiring com-
pany, an eminent Japanese businessman, showed me an English transla-
tion of an acquisition agreement involving an even greater sum of money,
which his company had simultaneously entered in Korea. The entire
agreement was only five pages long and merely described the parties,
price, terms of payment, and included a statement that all other terms
and conditions would be negotiated in good faith by the parties.
As an American lawyer, I was greatly disturbed by this occurrence.
It seemed impossible that a large Japanese corporation could spend one
hundred million dollars to acquire a new business in a foreign country,
and rely only on a five page agreement. Something had to be wrong.
Either the Japanese system was flawed or the Amerdcan system was at
fault.
After further analysis and reflection, I concluded that these differ-
ences did not result from the fault of either system, but rather from each
country's own internal rules of law and long-established business cus-
toms. Under the American system, the burden is on the buyer of a busi-
ness to take care of oneself. The doctrine of caveat emptor, derived from
the English common-law heritage, still governs. This is not due to a tra-
dition of dishonesty or of government approved chicanery, but rather to
the influence of modem America's trader predecessors, who placed the
burden squarely upon the shoulders of the buyer to investigate and be
certain. Furthermore, under the commercial law of most American
states, deeply rooted in the objective rule of contract law, agreements to
negotiate material terms in good faith are generally not held to be judi-
cially enforceable. The American jurisprudential system does not leave
issues of great and serious economic consequences to future good faith
negotiation between the parties. The rule of law continues to be that "an
agreement to agree" does not result in a-legally binding and enforceable
contractual obligation.'
In sharp contrast to the American jurisprudential system, the Japa-
nese legal system and its unique ethnic and cultural foundations make
1. There is, however, a notable trend away from the objective standard rule of American
contract law. This trend is evidenced by the judicial growth of such modem doctrines as
unconscionability, good faith and fair dealing, mistake, and impossibility, C. FRIED, CON-
TRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d
752, 768, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, 28 Cal.
3d 807, 820, 623 P.2d 165, 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 612 (1981), as well as by the development
of corresponding statutory rules (eg., Uniform Commercial Code "gap filler" rules),
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possible the Japanese style of contracting. Under the more subjective
Japanese system, the burden of diligence is placed on the seller, not the
buyer. The seller has a good faith duty to satisfy the buyer's reasonable
and good faith expectations in a business transaction. Moreover, a cove-
nant to negotiate material provisions of an agreement in good faith is
judicially enforceable. This legal structure is mandated by an ancient
and still strong Japanese tradition of honesty in business dealings, and by
the desire of businesspeople to maintain long-term relationships with
each other. In part, this tradition reflects the relatively low, as compared
to the United States, number of possible and potential business partners
in Japan, and one of the core Japanese social values of preserving and
enhancing one's business reputation and integrity. Finally, Japanese
businesspeople place an exceptionally high degree of trust and confidence
in the Japanese judicial system. All of this makes possible the five page
acquisition agreement to which my new Japanese friend referred.
After seeing the five page agreement, I informed my Japanese friend
that there is no way for a responsible Japanese buyer to make a Japanese
style contract in the United States. Just as American companies desiring
to go public in Japan must do so in the Japanese way, the Japanese com-
pany, whose transaction my friend handled had to do its U.S. acquisition
the American way.
It cannot honestly be said that one style of contract is better or
worse than the other. Americans who criticize the apparent slowness of
the decision-making process in Japanese business frequently fail to un-
derstand or appreciate the sociological and cultural reasons underlying
consensus management. Japanese who criticize Americans for being too
impatient and for making decisions too rapidly sometimes fail to note
that speed is made possible by highly refined information systems and an
extensive network of lawyers, accountants, and consultants. Moreover,
in America, decisiveness is generally considered a positive management
quality to be developed, appreciated, and rewarded.
One area in which these differences in Japanese and U.S. business
cultures are particularly relevant is acquisitions. Several questions pres-
ent themselves. Who, as between purchaser and seller, should assume
the risk of uncertainty concerning both past and future operations?
Should a seller be required to assure future sales or profits? Should a
purchaser be required to assume responsibility for future liabilities aris-
ing out of events or business operations prior to the sale? The following
is a nontechnical, practical discussion of such questions offered in the
hope of promoting greater understanding between multinational parties
1991]
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to business sale and acquisition agreements in the United States and
Japan.
II. REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES, AND
COVENANTS IN MULTINATIONAL
CONTRACTS: TWO VIEWS
A. The Nature and Role of Representations, Warranties, and
Covenants in General
A representation is a statement of fact made by one contracting
party for the purpose of inducing the other party to enter into the con-
tract. The party making the representation typically possesses unique
knowledge, or has the best opportunity to obtain it, and is therefore re-
quired to give assurance to the other party. For example, a seller may
represent to a purchaser that the seller knows of no reason why future
sales and profits should not continue to be as good as they have been in
the past, or that there are no collective bargaining or other long-term
employment agreements entangling the business for sale.
A warranty is a guarantee or assurance that a particular fact is true,
will be true at a future date, or both. For example, the seller may war-
rant to the purchaser that, as of the contract date, there were no liabili-
ties other than those set forth in the financial statements of the business.
A covenant is a promise to do something or to refrain from doing
something in the future. For example, a seller may covenant to maintain
all machinery and equipment in good working condition prior to the
closing date of the transaction.
All of the above are customary and normal means by which business
transactions are facilitated and contractual confidence between purchas-
ers and sellers created. However, they take on far greater importance in
contracts between multinational parties. Language differences, unfamili-
arity with local laws and accounting practices, tax and treaty restrictions,
and even concerns about racial and religious prejudices intensify feelings
of insecurity and heighten the need for strong contractual assurances.
The American philosophy of caveat emptor-let -the buyer beware-
does not help resolve these differences. Caveat emptor places the entire
burden of investigation and discovery upon the purchaser. In large part,
this explains the highly developed and extensive contracts that prevail in
the United States. The principal means used to bridge the "insecurity
gap" between purchaser and seller is the purchase investigation. A thor-
ough examination by a team of lawyers, accountants, engineers, and
other experts can do much to assuage a buyer's fears and provide infor-
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mation useful in the negotiation process. Unfortunately, due to either a
desire to maintain secrecy, to avoid unnecessary expenses, or to the impa-
tience of one or both of the parties, a purchase investigation is frequently
performed after a contract is signed, rather than before. Satisfaction with
the purchase investigation thus frequently becomes a condition precedent
to closing, rather than a condition precedent to signing.
B. Cultural Differences-The Decision-Making Process and
Japanese Uniqueness
Japan is famous throughout the world for employee loyalty and em-
ployee continuity. When employees are hired by Japanese companies,
they usually expect to spend their entire career with them. However,
most Japanese employers will refuse to solicit or even hire an employee
without a proven track record at another company. The result is that
Japanese managers are seriously concerned about making a mistake.
Every business transaction must be predictable in all respects. A major
mistake in a business acquisition could disgrace and sideline the career of
any Japanese executive, no matter how responsible the executive was per-
ceived to be before the error. Consequently, Japanese purchasers of for-
eign businesses encounter extreme pressure to avoid unplanned and
unforeseen negative events at all costs. This manifests itself in demands
for extreme contractual assurances-both in scope of assurance and du-
ration-that make many Americans recoil and sets the stage for lengthy
and acrimonious negotiations.
This is not to suggest that the desire to avoid error is unique to
Japanese managers. American executives are also rewarded for good
performance. However, a higher level of risk-taking is inherent in the
United States, particularly in the areas of litigation, taxation, and con-
tractual undertakings. Postacquisition events rarely stigmatize the exec-
utive responsible for the event, and even if stigmatized, such executives
can freely move laterally to similar positions with other employers. The
result is that in a business acquisition or sale, U.S. executives are typi-
cally willing to accept a greater level of risk than their Japanese
counterparts.
I. PARTICULAR SUBJECTS OF CONCERN AND
CONFLICT
A purchaser may reasonably require assurance that the values for
which the purchaser is paying are really present and will be present at the
closing. Thus, there is concern about obtaining good title to assets, con-
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firming sales and profits, and preserving trademarks and trade names.
Similarly, where liabilities are being assumed, either directly or as a re-
sult of the purchase of seller's stock, a purchaser must be certain that
liabilities are not greater than anticipated when the parties agreed upon
the purchase price. Representations and warranties serve both of these
ends.
A. Title
Title to real property is frequently a subject of controversy. Pur-
chasers want sellers not only to warrant the quality of title, but also the
condition of improvements, compliance with zoning and other land use
regulations, and the absence of toxic and other adverse environmental
and soil conditions. Sellers generally desire to sell real property in an "as
is, where is" condition, and would have purchasers rely solely upon title
insurance and due diligence for assurance as to conditions. However,
title insurance contains numerous exclusions and exceptions for which a
purchaser may properly require additional assurances. Moreover, title
insurance may not be available in a sufficient amount to insure the real
business values involved. For example, the total amount of monetary
protection available in the United States for any single transaction is
eight hundred sixty million dollars from Lloyds.
B. Environmental Issues
Environmental issues are the subject of much controversy and legis-
lation in the United States and elsewhere. In the United States, statutes
such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, the Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 as amended by the Superfund Amendments,
and the Reauthorization Act of 1986 (CERCLA), impose potentially im-
mense burdens, not only upon the actual polluter of real property, but
upon every subsequent owner in the chain of title. If the pollution affects
adjacent property or migrates by way of subterraneam aquifers, the re-
sulting liability could result in the insolvency of many owners. Thus,
even contractual assurances may not be sufficient to protect a purchaser,
unless supported by testing and analysis by an independent environmen-
tal consultant.
C. Financial Statements
Financial statement warranties are the most frequent source of con-
troversy in purchase and sale transactions. Initially, one should note that
generally accepted accounting principals (GAAP) in the United States
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are largely predicated upon the going concern concept, which assumes
that a business enterprise is a going concern which realizes the value of
its assets and discharges its liabilities in the ordinary course of business.
Japanese GAAP, on the other hand, are more conservative and, in cer-
tain respects, adopt more of a realization concept, which assumes almost
immediate liquidation. The inevitable result is, at the least, heated de-
bate between the accounting professionals from each country, or worse.
For example, where an American beverage company makes a large key
money payment to a supermarket chain to secure certain display space
for three years, U.S. GAAP permits (but does not require) the beverage
company to capitalize the payments and amortize them over the three
year period. Japanese accounting theory would strongly prefer expens-
ing the entire payment in the first year. If such conflicts are to be
avoided, careful definitions and very explicit language must be utilized.
Acquisition agreements must be specific as to what areas may differ and
what rules apply.
D. Taxes
The federal income tax system in the United States makes the pre-
dictability of the ultimate tax liability of a gains concern difficult, if not
impossible. This is particularly true for corporate taxpayers with com-
plex businesses, or those who are part of an affiliated group of corpora-
tions filing income tax returns on a combined or consolidated basis.
Factors contributing to the state of uncertainty include:
(1) Internal Revenue Service (IRS) interpretations of tax laws are
frequently not developed and published until long after (sometimes years
after) the effective date of such laws;
(2) IRS audits of tax returns frequently do not occur for several
years after the return is filed and the interpretative policy, audit policy,
or both policies regarding many issues may change several times during
this period;
(3) Hundreds of judicial decisions are published annually, interpret-
ing and reinterpreting tax laws; and
(4) Even where the taxpayer knows that adverse tax return adjust-
ments can be made, some returns may escape examination entirely and,
even if these returns are audited, many issues will not be recognized by
the auditor (this phenomenon is commonly referred to as the "audit
lottery").
State and local taxes of all kinds including income, gross receipts,
sales, use, property, and other taxes, are even more difficult to predict
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and evaluate. Some states, such as California and New York, are re-
garded by many as being more aggressive than the IRS in enforcing tax
laws and collecting taxes. Frequently, the period of time in which a state
may audit a return and assess a tax deficiency is longer than the period
allowed under federal law. Where a company is not primarily located in
a particular state, but merely sells products to residents of that state,
complex, esoteric legal principles govern whether the company has suffi-
cient contacts or other relationships with the state to require tax return
filing. If no tax returns have been filed in a state in which there are
significant contacts, the statute of limitations may be open indefinitely,
thus theoretically permitting future assessments for past activities for an
indefinite period of time.
The net result is that U.S. businesses, no matter how honest and
competent, may have a very limited ability to estimate future tax liabili-
ties, pertaining to prior operating periods. Traditional financial state-
ment warranties are generally regarded, as insufficient to deal with
income tax liabilities, so supplemental and separate tax warranties are
thus usually given by the seller of a going concern. Ultimately, it is a
matter of negotiation as to who bears the risk.
IV. PURCHASE AND SALE OF STOCK vs. ASSETS-AN
AGE-OLD CONFLICT
A time-honored method for purchasers to reduce risk is to buy as-
sets and assume only certain specified liabilities. Since the purchaser is
not acquiring an entity, the purchaser will generally not be liable for un-
scheduled, undisclosed, or purely contingent liabilities of the seller.
Although sometimes helpful, this approach can also have disadvantages,
among which are the following:
(1) A corporate seller will be required to incur and pay a tax at the
corporate level on the appreciation in certain assets, as well as a tax at
the shareholder level upon liquidation (a second or double tax), thus di-
minishing the effective after-tax selling price to seller's shareholders;
(2) Thoroughness and diligence are required to insure that all of
seller's business assets are being transferred;
(3) The seller may own intangible assets, such as contract rights and
legal claims which either are not transferable at all, or the transfer of
which requires the consent of third parties; and
(4) More time is required, the documentation is more complex, and
the transactional costs (legal, accounting, and other costs) are greater
than in the case of a sale of the stock of the selling corporation.
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Thus, while this acquisition technique is sometimes helpful, it is not
always a viable alternative.
V. LIMITING THE EFFECT OF REPRESENTATIONS,
WARRANTIES, AND COVENANTS THROUGH THE USE
OF SURVIVAL, BASKET, CAP,
AND MATERIALITY PROVISIONS
A. Survival of Representations and Warranties
Except for warranties relating to the title of real property, which are
expressed or implied by law in conveyance instruments, representations
and warranties generally do not survive closing unless the agreement ex-
pressly so provides. Thus, a purchaser always desires to provide in the
agreement that representations and warranties survive the closing for a
period of years. Sellers typically are anxious to avoid and cut off obliga-
tions and, accordingly, attempt to either avoid survival of the closing or
limit survival to the shortest possible period of time. Although this is
ultimately a matter of negotiation and relative bargaining power, repre-
sentations and warranties typically survive from one to three years. It is
also possible to have separate survival periods for different warranties.
B. Baskets, Maximum Limitations, and Materiality
In business, the imprecision of books and records is a given fact.
Nearly all businesses commit minor infractions of law. Financial state-
ments, particularly reserves and other valuation accounts, as well as ac-
cruals, are mere estimates. Even the most well-managed business cannot
be certain that it has filed all required tax returns in all applicable states
and local jurisdictions. Thus, many representations and warranties are
designed to assure approximate accuracy, not perfection.
One way to adjust contract rights to reality is by way of a material-
ity standard. Thus, a warranty may only apply to material agreements,
and securities filings may be complete and accurate in all material re-
spects. The best drafted contracts contain a definition of materiality.
Otherwise, judges or arbitrators would be left to their own devices to
resolve specific issues.
Another contractual shock absorber is a provision (commonly re-
ferred to as a basket or cushion) that no claim may be made for breach of
representation or warranty unless the aggregate damages exceed some
minimum amount, usually a percentage of the total consideration. De-
pending upon the magnitude of the transaction, the minimum may range
from ten thousand dollars to one million dollars or more. A corollary
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issue is whether, if damages exceed the minimum amount, the breaching
party should reimburse the injured party from the first dollar of loss, or
only for the excess. Such provisions are designed to do the following: (1)
officially recognize that representations and warranties are intended to be
true in an overall sense, not literally perfect; and (2) prevent constant
harassment and disputes over relatively minor sums.
Finally, some contracts establish an aggregate maximum amount
that can be recovered for breach of representations and warranties. Gen-
erally, such damages should not exceed the original purchase price paid.
The concept of this provision is that the seller, in order to be induced to
sell, must have some assurance that some minimum purchase price will
be received in any event. Moreover, in the absence of an overall limita-
tion on claims, it is theoretically possible that aggregate claims could
exceed the purchase price (for example, a clean-up order issued under
CERCLA). However, negotiations generally lead to far smaller
maximums.
VI. REMEDIES-THE CONTINGENT PURCHASE PRICE
Businesses are sometimes bought and sold based upon the balance
sheet net worth. At other times, prices are predicated upon past or fu-
ture sales or earnings. Because of the direct relationship between the
purchase price and the promise, a portion of the purchase price is some-
times reserved or deposited in escrow, to be disbursed only upon final
confirmation of the agreed upon net worth or actual achievement of the
sales or earnings promises.
This technique is also useful in cases in which the seller intends to
distribute the purchase price to numerous shareholders after closing. It
may be impractical for the purchaser to pursue rights against a liquidated
corporation or a disbursed group of individual shareholders. A partial
purchase price escrow or a deferred payment of a portion of the purchase
price assures a fund out of which an injured party can obtain
compensation.
Sellers also sometimes are concerned about the purchaser's financial
ability to perform future obligations. A foreign purchaser may form an
acquisition company to operate in the host country (purchase subsidi-
ary). The purchase subsidiary may not have enough funds to close until
the closing. Or, after closing, purchased assets may be transferred to
other affiliates of the purchaser, leaving the purchase subsidiary with in-
sufficient assets or liquidity with which to discharge assumed liabilities or
pay warranty claims. A purchase escrow also addresses those needs.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Buyers and sellers always have different goals in any transaction.
Buyers want to minimize costs and risks, and maximize net values. Sell-
ers want to maximize the price and terminate risk-taking. These two
views are logical and natural, not artificial, having nothing to do with the
nationality of the respective parties. However, the fact that parties are of
different nationalities creates additional new challenges to understand
and address concerns related to the social, cultural, and legal back-
grounds of each party. Creativity in applying traditional legal aids is
required. Above all, the parties must bring to the bargaining table a spe-
cial willingness to do the following: (1) hear and understand each other's
problems; (2) address issues of concern to the other party; and (3) estab-
lish trust and goodwill by their acts and deeds in the course of the con-
duct of their negotiations.

